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ABSTRACT
Some countries (e.g. Brazil) have good reputations on AIDS policy, whereas others, (notably South Africa) have been criticized for inadequate
leadership. Cross-country regression analysis reveals that these ‘poster children’ for AIDS leadership have indeed performed better or worse than
expected given their economic and institutional constraints and the demographic and health challenges facing them. Regressions were run on
HAART coverage (number on highly active antiretroviral therapy as percentage of total need) and MTCTP coverage (pregnant HIVþ women acces-
sing mother-to-child-transmission prevention services as percentage of total need). Brazil, Cambodia, Thailand and Uganda (all of whom have
established reputations for good leadership on AIDS performed consistently better than expected—as did Burkina-Faso, Suriname, Paraguay Costa
Rica, Mali and Namibia. South Africa, which has the worst reputation for AIDS leadership, performed significantly below expectations—as did
Uruguay and Trinidad and Tobago. The paper thus confirms much of the conventional wisdom on AIDS leadership at country level and suggests
new areas for research.
Keywords geography, health services, socioeconomics factors
Introduction
The acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) remains
a major challenge for global health. Despite an unprece-
dented mobilization of resources since 2003 (notably the
Global Fund to fight AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria and
the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
(PEPFAR)), the epidemic continues to outstrip attempts to
rein it in. In 2007, 2.1 million people died of AIDS and
2.5 million became infected with the human immunodefi-
ciency virus (HIV) bringing the global total living with HIV
to an estimated 33.2 million.1
Part of the problem is that as foreign assistance flows into
AIDS-affected countries, inadequacies at the national level
have become apparent. This has placed the spotlight on
government ‘leadership’ on AIDS.1 – 5 Some countries, notably
Brazil, Botswana, Cambodia, Thailand and Mexico have
established good reputations for promoting condoms and
access to antiretrovirals for mother-to-child-transmission
prevention (MTCTP) and highly active antiretroviral therapy
(HAART).6 – 13 By contrast, South Africa is infamous for
President Mbeki’s support for AIDS denialism and suspi-
cion towards antiretrovirals,14 Russia and Ukraine have repu-
tations for stigmatizing injecting drug users, and China and
Zimbabwe for human rights abuses.3 – 5 Other countries
have more contested reputations. For example, Uganda’s
President Museveni is widely acclaimed for raising awareness
about HIV,15 – 17 but the country’s image has been harmed
by the cancellation of a Global Fund loan and reports of
inefficiencies and confusion in AIDS prevention and treat-
ment interventions.3,5,17,18 Cuba, having initially been criti-
cized for confining HIV-positive people to sanitaria,19 is
now seen as a role model for providing HAART20 and
MTCTP.21 Countries with growing reputations on AIDS lea-
dership include, Rwanda, Haiti, Malawi and Namibia.1,5
But are these reputations for (good or bad) AIDS leader-
ship deserved, or do they simply reflect differential
capacities and constraints? For example, when a newspaper
article blamed South Africa’s reluctance to roll out HAART
on Mbeki’s AIDS denialism,22 the South African ambassa-
dor responded by pointing to the growing public sector
HAART rollout.23 Given that South Africa has the largest
HAART program in the world (a point Mbeki himself likes
to make)24 and faces real economic and institutional
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constraints,25 is it really appropriate to argue that South
Africa’s leadership has been inadequate?
A potentially useful way to approach this is to frame the
question of leadership explicitly within the context of what
was possible and reasonable to expect. This paper accordingly
uses cross-country regression analysis of HAART coverage
(i.e. the number of people on HAART as a percentage of
those estimated to need it) to explore which countries demon-
strate relatively good or bad outcomes given the challenges
and opportunities open to them, and in light of international
standards set by performance in other countries. HAART
coverage, of course, only captures one aspect of AIDS
policy—but it has the advantage of being the most widely
reported outcome variable available. MTCTP coverage is also
explored, but to a more limited extent as these data are less
reliable and are available for fewer countries. The analysis was
conducted on 82 AIDS-affected developing and transitional
countries. Data were sourced from UNAIDS, the WHO and
the World Bank.
Methods
Regression analysis on HAART coverage is employed to
account for the impact of socio-economic and institutional
factors beyond the control of governments. The regression
residual (the difference between actual and predicted HAART
coverage) thus indicates which countries are performing better
or worse than expected given these factors.26–28 Countries
demonstrating good leadership on AIDS would be expected
to have high positive residuals (and vice versa for those with
reputations for bad leadership). However, as the residual picks
up the influence of all omitted variables, country performance
assessments were made only on the basis of consistently large
residuals. The decision rule was to classify only those
countries with residuals consistently .15 (i.e. actual HAART
coverage exceeds predicted coverage by 15 percentage points)
as performing above expectations. Those with residuals con-
sistently between 215 and 15 were classified as performing
‘as expected’ and those with residuals below 215, as per-
forming ‘below expectations’. Residuals were generated using
three different plausible regression specifications. These are
presented in Table 1 along with residuals for selected
countries. Fig. 2 shows the residuals for all countries.
The key economic indicator of domestic capacity to roll
out HAART is per capita income, i.e. the level of economic
development. As can be seen in Fig. 2, there is a positive
(but weak) relationship between per capita income and the
level of HAART coverage. Countries above the regression
line are doing better in terms of HAART coverage than
would be expected if per capita income was the only factor
driving HAART coverage (and vice versa for those below the
line). The recognized poor performers (e.g. Russia, Ukraine
and South Africa) fall substantially below the line
(suggesting that they should have achieved higher levels of
coverage given their level of development), and the poster
children for good performance (Cambodia, Cuba, Brazil,
Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, Rwanda, Thailand, Uganda)
fall substantially above it.
The level of development is a potentially important deter-
minant of HAART coverage—but it is not the only one. It
is thus necessary to run multivariate regressions taking into
account a range of other country-specific characteristics
which are likely to impact on HAART coverage and which
are beyond the immediate control of governments. These
are discussed below.
Some countries started rolling out HAART almost entirely
on the basis of their own resources (notably Brazil and
Cuba), but most were assisted to do so by significant external
funding from donors. Although engaging constructively at
national level with foreign donors is in itself a sign of good
leadership (as is recognized to be the case in Rwanda and
Botswana), foreign assistance to combat AIDS has been
channeled through the Global Fund and PEPFAR to a wide
variety of organizations and non governmental organisations
as well as to different levels of government, not all of which
are necessarily in agreement with national policy on AIDS.
The impact of these additional resources thus should be
taken into account—and is done so through the inclusion of
dummy variables for whether a country is a PEPFAR focus
country or not or was a recipient of a (first round) Global
Fund grant or not.
Internal and external resources are crucial determinants
of HAART coverage, but so too is the scale of the chal-
lenge facing governments. For this reason, both the
(logged) total of HIV-positive population and adult HIV
prevalence rates were included as controls—as was the (log
of ) the number of disability adjusted life years (DALYs)
lost due to non-AIDS-related reasons. To take into account
that it is easier to provide HAART to concentrated urban
populations rather than scattered, poorly resourced rural
populations, we also include the percentage of HIV-positive
people living in urban areas as an explanatory variable. The
percentage of births in the presence of skilled health pro-
fessionals was included as an indicator of the reach of the
health sector, and two political/institutional variables (poli-
tical stability in 2005 and a dummy variable for whether a
country is an established democracy or not) were included as
proxies for broader governmental/institutional capacity.
Language fractionalization could be included on the
grounds that providing HAART to many different language













Table 1 Regressions on HAART coverage and MTCTP coverage
Log of HAART coverage: December 2006 Log of MTCTP
coverage (2005)
1 2 3 4
Constant 4.437 1.938 0.507 1.978
(2.961) (2.613) (2.080) (4.692)
0.138 0.461 0.808 0.675
(Log) GDP per capita (PPP) (2005) 0.094 0.220 0.261 0.073
(0.208) (0.181) (0.171) (0.303)
0.651 0.229 0.132 0.810
PEPFAR focus country 0.556** 0.581*** 0.512** 0.487
(0.209) (0.193) (0.211) (0.383)
0.010 0.004 0.018 0.210
Global Fund first round recipient 0.293 0.311 0.402* 0.161
(0.236) (0.234) (0.218) (0.304)
0.218 0.170 0.070 0.600
(Log) adult HIV prevalence (2005) 0.202** 0.222*** 0.176* 0.330**
(0.084) (0.076) (0.095) (0.142)
0.018 0.005 0.070 0.025
(Log) HIVþ population (2005) 20.098 20.075 20.007 0.014
(0.070) (0.062) (0.052) (0.140)
0.164 0.234 0.894 0.922
Proportion of HIVþ people in urban areas 0.881** 0.793** 0.522* 1.091**
(0.342) (0.321) (0.316) (0.538)
0.012 0.016 0.103 0.049
Political stability (2005) 0.107 0.072 0.105 0.086
(0.133) (0.128) (0.122) (0.159)
0.424 0.577 0.391 0.593
Established democracy 0.483** 0.438** 0.062 0.132**
(0.203) (0.210) (0.221) (0.354)
0.020 0.041 0.781 0.711
% of births with skilled health professionals 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.026***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
0.492 0.825 0.650 0.000
(Log) non-AIDS DALYs per capita (2002) 20.347 20.011 20.021 20.598
(0.315) (0.287) (0.242) (0.477)
0.275 0.968 0.932 0.216
Language fractionalization 20.948*** 20.643
(0.294) (0.427)
0.002 0.137























groups poses additional costs and challenges. However, a
negative relationship between language fractionalization and
HAART coverage may reflect a policy choice not to provide
HAART to certain groups rather than the degree of diffi-
culty involved in providing HAART for all (E. Lieberman,
in press). Hence, this variable is not included in the main
regression but is added to regression 2 as part of the sensi-
tivity analysis. Similarly, regional differences could be
included on the grounds that they are necessary for captur-
ing the impact of potentially relevant regionally specific cul-
tural and epidemiological differences which may be relevant
to a HAART rollout. However, this is a blunt instrument
for doing so. Furthermore, regional dummies may be
picking up common patterns of AIDS leadership within
regions (and if so, including regional dummies would be
inappropriate for our purposes here). Thus, regional
dummies were included only as part of the sensitivity analy-
sis (regression 3) rather than in the main regression.
Results
Table 1 reports the results of three (robust) regression
models. The main regression (regression 1) controls for
level of development (gross domestic product per capita),
Table 1 Continued
Log of HAART coverage: December 2006 Log of MTCTP
coverage (2005)




N 82 78 78 55
Adjusted R2 0.5017 0.5697 0.6494 0.6097
F 7.86 9.99 10.74 11.75
Prob . F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Botswana# 0 0 7.8 250.2
Brazil 43.6 31.6 16.2 26.2
Burkina-Faso 27.1 27.7 24.3 3.2
Cambodia 59.3 48.5 60.4 20.7
Cuba 73.9
Gambia 21.7 1.7 21.8 3.6
Haiti 14.6 3.6
Latvia 255.2 235.6 26.5
Malawi 26.3 13.5 16.9 0.6
Mexico 56.2 52.6 38.5
Namibia 18.6 24.9 25.1 1.0
Paraguay 42.0 48.3 35.4
Russia 28.6 215.6 29.8 67.5
Rwanda 33.3 29.9
South Africa 236.1 224.1 242.6 239.0
Thailand 48.8 56.8 66.1
Uganda 16.7 19.9 18.2 5.8
Ukraine 216.1 215.4 213.5 75.4
Zambia 29.0 21.2 6.8 3.0
Zimbabwe 28.0 210.3 26.2 27.9
GDP, gross domestic product.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*p,0.100, **p,0.050, ***p,0.001.
#Regression models 1 and 2 actually predicted negative residuals for Botswana—indicating relatively poor performance. However, as Botswana already has
100% HAART coverage, this is an unreasonable imputation, and hence the residual was rounded up to 0. This was the only case for which a model
predicted HAART coverage in excess of 100%.













external support (being a PEPFAR country or in receipt of
Global Fund first round funding), the scale of the epidemic
(HIV prevalence, the absolute size of the HIV-positive
population and its distribution between urban and rural
areas), other heath-related demands (non-AIDS DALY’s per
capita) and politico-institutional capacity (political stability,
being an established democracy and percentage of births
attended by skilled personnel). Four variables had statisti-
cally significant coefficients. The results indicate that
controlling for the other variables in the model, being a
PEPFAR focus country raises HAART coverage by 67%;
for every 1% increase in HIV prevalence, HAART coverage
is predicted to rise by 0.2%; for every one percentage point
increase in the share of the HIV-positive population in
urban areas, HAART coverage rises by 2.5%; and being an
established democracy raises HAART coverage by 55%.
[Note that for unlogged variables, these results reflect the
antilog of the coefficients reported in Table 1]
Fig. 1 HAART coverage and per capita income.
Fig. 2 Regression residuals for Regression 1. Black bars indicate scores of below 215 for all three regressions. Checked bars indicate scores of above 15 for
all three regressions. Gray bars represent scores 15 and ,15. White bars indicate that one of the regressions gave a different ranking to that of regression
1 (and those with darker borders indicate that missing data made it impossible to obtain predictions for these countries using regressions 2 and 3).













Adding language fractionalization to the model
(regression 2) does not affect the sign or significance of the
key variables much. It is significantly negatively correlated
with HAART coverage (for every one percentage point
increase in language fractionalization HAART coverage
declines by 1.1%). Countries with diversified populations in
terms of language thus do have smaller HAART rollouts
but, as noted above, we cannot be sure whether this is the
result of objective constraints or policy choices.
Adding a set of regional dummies (regression 3) renders
the stable democracy variable insignificant, results in first
round funding from the Global Fund becoming marginally
significant but important (controlling for the other variables,
being a recipient of first round funding from the Global
Fund raises HAART coverage by 50%) and increases the
overall explanatory power of the model. However, to what
extent regional dummies are capturing objective contextual
factors or are picking up policy stances which may be
similar within regions, is unclear.
Table 1 reports the regression residuals for selected
countries. Note that some country’s residuals vary signifi-
cantly across different specifications. For example, Brazil’s
actual HAART coverage exceeds its predicted coverage by a
massive 43.6 percentage points using regression 1 but when
language fractionalization is included, the residual falls to
31.6 (because Brazil is relatively homogenous in terms of
language). When regional dummy variables are included as
well (regression 3), Brazil’s residual drops down to 16.2
because Latin American countries have higher HAART
rollouts, and hence by including regional dummies, we are
effectively holding Brazil to a higher standard simply
because it is part of a region which has good HAART
coverage.
Fig. 2 shows the residuals from regression 1 for all 82
countries. Brazil’s result is reported in a checked pattern to
indicate that all three specifications produced a residual of
.15 (our cut-off point for a good performer). Ten other
countries (Burkina-Faso, Cambodia, Costa Rica, Mali,
Namibia, Suriname, Thailand, Paraguay and Uganda) also
consistently obtained residuals of .15. Four countries
(Cuba, Haiti, El Salvador and Rwanda) have no predicted
values for regressions 2 and 3 because of missing data on
language fractionalization. If we consider the results for
these countries from regression 1 to be definitive, then
Cuba and Rwanda would also be classified as relatively good
performers.
Out of the 82 AIDS-affected countries analyzed, 46 had
residuals falling between 215 and 15 for all three
regressions, and hence should probably be regarded as per-
forming as expected (or at least as not performing
significantly worse or better than predicted). Their
regression 1 residuals are represented as gray bars in Fig. 1.
Eighteen countries in total had inconsistent classifications
arising from different specifications. Their regression 1
residuals are depicted with a white bar. Three countries
(South Africa, Uruguay and Trinidad and Tobago) had pre-
dicted residuals of below 215 for all three regressions and
thus we can confidently conclude that they probably could
(and should) have achieved higher levels of HAART
coverage.
Table 1 also reports the results of a single regression
(using the same explanatory variables as in regression 1) on
(the log of ) MTCTP coverage. As one would expect,
MTCTP coverage is significantly (and substantially) posi-
tively associated with maternal health services (i.e. percen-
tage of births attended by a skilled health professional). Like
the HAART coverage regressions, it also varies significantly
positively with the proportion of HIV-positive people in
urban areas, with HIV prevalence and being an established
democracy. However, unlike the HAART regressions,
support from the Global Fund and PEPFAR were not sig-
nificant determinants of MTCTP coverage. Note that as the
MTCTP coverage data were available for only 55 out of the
82 countries, these preliminary results should be treated
with caution.
Discussion
Main finding of this study
This study provides empirical support for much of the con-
ventional wisdom about AIDS leadership at country level.
Using HAART coverage as the key indicator of commitment
to combating AIDS, the data show that Brazil, Cambodia,
Mexico, Namibia, Thailand, Uganda and probably also Cuba
and Rwanda have indeed performed better than expected
given their institutional characteristics, demographic chal-
lenges and level of development. Their reputation as poster
children for good AIDS leadership is thus probably well
deserved. Botswana, which has universal HAART coverage,
was assessed to be performing as expected—i.e. that univer-
sal coverage is the expected level of HAART coverage for a
country with its relatively favorable characteristics. However,
it is alarming that Botswana performed below expectations
with regard to MTCTP coverage. More research is required
to explore why Botswana is failing to achieve the levels of
MTCTP coverage it should be reaching given its
characteristics.
South Africa’s reputation for poor AIDS leadership was
strongly endorsed by the analysis. It suggests that South













Africa had the resources and capacity to have achieved sub-
stantially higher levels of HAART coverage and MTCTP
coverage (Fig. 3). This is consistent with the argument that
it was probably ideological reasons which constrained the
use of antiretrovirals for MTCTP or HAART rather than
economic or institutional constraints. Other countries with
reputations for poor leadership on AIDS (Russia, Ukraine,
Gambia, Zimbabwe and Zambia) did not, however, meet
our strict criteria for labeling a country as a poor performer
(i.e. that all three regression residuals fall below 215). It is,
however, interesting to note the vast discrepancy between
Russia and Ukraine’s relative performance on HAART and
on MTCTP. The fact that both countries were able to
perform relatively well with regard to MTCTP—but not
with regard to HAART—suggests that the government was
indeed more prepared to devote resources to the needs of
pregnant HIV-positive women and their children than they
were to assisting people with AIDS (most of whom were
stigmatized injecting drug users).
Latvia performed substantially worse than expected using
regressions 1 and 2, but not once regional dummies were
included. This case is probably also worth looking into in
more detail, especially given that the few reports on
HAART provision in Latvia are broadly positive.29 Further
research would also be useful to those countries which per-
formed significantly better than expected, but which do not
have established reputations for good AIDS leadership
(notably Mali, Burkina-Faso and Suriname). It is possible
that in the general discourse about AIDS leadership, insuf-
ficient attention has been paid to the leadership role that
governments can play in facilitating the importation and
distribution of generic antiretrovirals (as occurs in Burkina-
Faso)30 and in ensuring that the health system is well orga-
nized and efficient (as is the case in Suriname, but not in
Trinidad and Tobago).31,32
What is already known on this topic
As discussed in the introduction, some countries have estab-
lished reputations for good or bad leadership on AIDS.
These, however, are based on anecdotal evidence. There
have been a few attempts to measure the impact of AIDS
leadership, but these have been based on qualitative assess-
ments of country performance and are limited in
coverage.26,33
What this study adds
This paper provides a systematic empirical analysis of the
impact of AIDS leadership on HAART coverage using a
large sample of 82 AIDS-affected countries. It builds on
previous work using regression analysis to explore the role
of political leadership on AIDS indirectly taking into
account ‘objective’ constraints/opportunities facing govern-
ments.26 – 28 This methodology allows us to assess whether a
country is performing significantly better or worse given its
country characteristics—and hence whether its reputation
for good or bad leadership on AIDS is deserved. The study
Fig. 3 HAART coverage and MTCTP coverage.













also reveals some countries without established reputations for
AIDS leadership as relatively good (or bad) performers—
thereby pointing to new areas for research.
Limitations of this study
The study is limited by the available international data. Also,
by capturing political leadership indirectly (through the
residual) the analysis is necessarily imprecise (that is why
sensitivity analysis was conducted using several regression
specifications and why wide bands were constructed for
classifying countries). Note also that HAART coverage is
but one indicator of the wide range of policy responses
necessary for combating AIDS and tells us nothing about
the characteristics of country-level programs which may
have relevance for clinical outcomes and the development
of drug resistance.
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